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Earlier this week, I hooked up for a lunch with George Archer and Jonathan Nitzan, two friends of mine who also
had previous stints working at BCA Research. I enjoyed our lunch and conversation. After we met, Jonathan sent
me a paper he published along with Shimshon Bichler, “Can Capitalists Afford a Trumped Recovery?”:
The presidential election of Donald Trump has rekindled hopes for a U.S. recovery. The new
president promises to ‘make America great again’, partly by creating many millions of new jobs
for U.S. workers, and judging by the rising stock market, capitalists seem to love his narrative.
But if Trump actually delivers on his promise, their attitude is likely to change
radically. In our 2016 paper, ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’, we developed the concept of a
‘CasP policy cycle’, the idea that government policy, insofar as it caters to the imperative of
capitalized power, favours low employment growth in order to enable low rates of interest and
sustain the capitalist share of income. If Trump proceeds with and succeeds in reversing
this CasP policy cycle, his authoritarianism may end up undermining rather than
boosting capitalized power. In this sense, his regime could well mark the beginning
of the next major bear market.
Let me begin by stating this, Jonathan and Shimshon aren’t some Marxist utopian quacks. They fully understand
neoclassical economics and its limitations in explaining power structures and what really drives the financial and
economic world order. They published a book, Capital as Power, that offers a radical alternative to the
conventional theories of capitalism.
Also, before becoming a professor of political economy at York University, Jonathan worked a few years at BCA
Research covering emerging markets with George Archer and Chen Zhao. He knows all about markets and the
traditional way of analyzing economies and financial markets.
But his and Shimshon’s analysis of the economy is far deeper than anything you’re going to read at BCA or any
other investment and economic research outfit. And unlike many academics, Shimshon and Jonathan use
economic and financial data to create great charts that support their points and to draw inferences on how power
structures impact the stock market.
“Leo, that’s great, but I’m just looking to beat my benchmark so I can make a lot of money at the end of the year. I
can’t be bothered reading this intellectual mumbo jumbo, it’s beyond my capacity to grasp. I need actionable
ideas which will help me secure a big bonus at the end of the year.”
Well then, go read nice papers from Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and others, but if you really want to be
challenged to think about the world and what really is behind stock market moves, you should invest some time to
read these papers, they will open your eyes to another level of thinking about the way capitalism really works and
how this impacts employment, rates, inflation and the stock market (at the very least, you will understand why
winter is coming on stocks!).
Are these papers similar to Bridgewater’s “epic” study, Populism: The Phenomenon, put out earlier this year? No,
they are much deeper and offer a lot more insights than anything Bridgewater has put out on what exactly is going
on right now.
To be blunt, these are the papers that Ray Dalio and company should be reading to understand how the “economic
machine” really works in the world we live in and it’s definitely the type of stuff that George Soros can appreciate,
especially in his old age.
Alright, now that I’ve given you my biased introduction, let’s go over Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s
short paper, “Can Capitalists Afford a Trumped Recovery?” (added emphasis is mine):
The presidential election of Donald Trump has rekindled hopes for a U.S. recovery. The new
president promises to ‘make America great again’, partly by creating many millions of new jobs
for U.S. workers, and judging by the rising stock market, capitalists seem to love his narrative.
But if Trump actually delivers on his promise, their attitude is likely to change radically.
1. What if Unemployment Falls and Employment Growth Accelerates?
First, the capitalist share of domestic income will probably drop precipitously. Figure 1 – an
up-to-date version of a chart first published in Nitzan and Bichler (2014a, 2014b) [link] [link] –
shows why. The top part of the chart plots the sum of pretax profit and net interest as a share of
domestic income on the left scale, along with the unemployment rate three years earlier on the
right. The bottom part of the chart shows the annual rates of change of these two series (with all
data smoothed as five-year trailing averages; click on image).
The historical facts here are rather unambiguous: since the 1940s, lower rates of
unemployment have been followed, three years later, by a lower capitalist income
share. And if this relationship continues to hold, the implications for capitalists are
doubly negative. Since unemployment has already been trending downward for the
past few years, the capitalist income share is likely to lose further ground in the
three years ahead quite independently of Trump’s policies. And if these policies
end up delivering even lower rates of unemployment, the capitalist income share is
likely to shrink further.
Second, a significant rise in employment will probably kill the stock market. Figure
2 – taken from our paper ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2016: 146)
[link] – compares two series. On the left, it plots the ratio of stock prices to the wage rate, an
index for the power of capitalists relative to workers. On the right, it displays the rate of growth
of employment five years earlier, an inverted proxy for the strategic sabotage inflicted on
workers (the two series are smoothed as ten-year trailing averages; click on image).
And here too the historical regularity seems clear: since the 1940s, rising
employment growth has been followed, five years later, by a falling stock market
(since the wage rate is usually a monotonically rising series, most of the movement
here comes from changes in stock prices). With this pattern in mind, investor
enthusiasm for employment growth policies seems somewhat misplaced: if the
Trump administration succeeds in reversing the 30-year downtrend in
employment growth, the likely result will be not a secular bull run, but a major
bear market.
2. The Current Crossroad
To put these constraints in a longer historical context, consider the following excerpts from our
article ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’ [link]:
Over the past thirty years, U.S.-based capitalists (and others investing in U.S.
equities) have managed to increase their capitalized power relative to the
underlying population from record lows to record highs [Figure 2 above]. In
our view, this increase has been driven by two related processes: (1)
a redistribution of income from non-capitalists to capitalists, along
with a growing conviction that the resulting inequality could be
maintained and even augmented in the future; and (2) mounting
strategic sabotage in the form of lower employment growth. [. . .
The] first process meant a higher hype coefficient [i.e., overly optimistic
long-term profit expectations] The second process has had a double impact: on
the one hand, it assisted the first process by restricting wages and boosting
profits, while, on the other, it enabled looser monetary policy and lower
interest rates, thus helping to reduce the normal rate of return [and raising the
discounted value of expected future profit].
These two processes were in turn underwritten by a major
creordering of the underlying mode of power. Following the MBM
[major bear market] of 1968‑1981, capital has been progressively
transnationalized, leading to the gradual disempowerment of the underlying
domestic populations, the lowering of corporate and personal tax rates for
high-net-worth individuals, the hijacking of macroeconomic policy for
capitalized ends and the cajoling-forcing of pension funds and public assets
into the stock market, among others consequences. But no spring can be
pulled indefinitely. Conflict-driven redistribution and lower
interest rates have pushed capitalized power toward its historical
asymptote, and this approach means that the United States – and
maybe the world as a whole – is now facing a historical crossroad.
(Bichler and Nitzan 2016: 150-151)
Given this assessment, we outlined two possible trajectories for the U.S. looking forward:
The less likely of the two is some version of Jack London’s The Iron Heel
(1907), in which the U.S. ruling class breaks through its historical asymptote
by imposing a mode of power much harsher than the one prevailing over the
past two centuries. To sustain this new mode of power, the rulers
would have to further redistribute income in their favour,
domestically and/or globally, leading to historically unprecedented
levels of inequality. Moreover and crucially, they would have to cast
this greater inequality as the ‘new normal’ as well as persuade
investors that this greater inequality is here to stay (so as to prevent
hype from collapsing). And while doing all of that, they would also need to
keep interest rates and profit volatility low in order to prevent the discount
rate from rising significantly – a tall order in a world marked by greater
sabotage, intensified violence and therefore greater instability. The other,
and in our view more likely, possibility is that history will repeat
itself, and that, sooner or later, the United States will experience
another MBM [major bear market]. (Bichler and Nitzan 2016: 151)
3. A Trumped Recovery?
How do Trump’s hyped rhetoric and proposed policies fit into this framework? On the face of it,
his authoritarianism, apparent disdain to the rule of law and promiscuous endorsement of
violence make him a possible harbinger of the much harsher regime needed to secure and
possibly extend current levels of capitalized power. This harsher regime, though, would
have to cater to capitalist interests, and so far, Trump’s proposed policies point in
the opposite direction.
Modern capitalism is guided by differential capitalization – particularly differential stock prices
– and differential stock prices are driven not by rapid economic growth, but by the ability of
owners to increase their capitalized power relative to the underlying population. As noted,
since the 1980s, the differential capitalized power of stock owners increased due to
a combination of a rising capitalist income share and falling interest rates, and
taken at face value, Trump’s policies threaten both.
As we have shown in Figure 1, Trump’s focus on job growth stands to undermine
the capitalist share of income. But job growth is likely to hurt capitalists in another
important way – namely, by causing interest rates to soar and in so doing further
undermining equity prices.
The history of this latter process is illustrated in Figure 3 (updated from Bichler and Nitzan
2016). The chart shows two series: the annual rate of growth of employment (lagged five years)
plotted against the left scale and the yield on ten-year government bonds on the right. We can
see that, until the middle of the twentieth century, there was little or no connection between the
two series (Pearson coefficient of –0.12). But from the early 1960s onward, with the
entrenchment of countercyclical Keynesianism, employment growth has become a nearly perfect
five-year leading predictor for interest rates (with a Pearson correlation of +0.89). During the
1960s and 1970s, the welfare-warfare state lessened the strategic sabotage on the
underlying population and accelerated employment growth, but this process
triggered higher interest rates that grounded the stock market. The 1980s rise of
neoliberalism, though, flipped the cycle. Employment growth decelerated, interest
rates dropped, and the capitalized power of owners, fuelled by growing strategic
sabotage and rising liquidity, soared (click on image).
In our ‘CasP Model of the Stock Market’ (2016) [link], we developed the concept of a ‘CasP policy
cycle’, the idea that government policy, insofar as it caters to the imperative of capitalized power,
favours low employment growth in order to enable low rates of interest and sustain the capitalist
share of income. If Trump proceeds with and succeeds in reversing this CasP policy
cycle, his authoritarianism may end up undermining rather than boosting
capitalized power. In this sense, his regime could well mark the beginning of the
next major bear market.
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Now, I’m not concerned about President Trump undermining rather than boosting capitalized power. Importantly,
if you look at his closest economic advisors, they are all part of the financial elite like his friend Stephen
Schwarzman, CEO and co-founder of private equity powerhouse Blackstone, so you can rest assured his
administration will keep on trying to boost capitalized power.
On Friday, US payroll gains rebounded in April by more than forecast and the jobless rate unexpectedly fell to 4.4
percent, signaling that the labor market remains healthy and should support continued increases in consumer
spending. According to Shimshon and Jonathan, employment gains will cause interest rates to soar and
I wouldn’t read too much into this latest employment report. Employment is a coincident economic indicator, not a
leading indicator, but this will provide the Fed an excuse to raise rates at least one more time. The Fed wants to
raise rates to have ammunition when the next crisis strikes.
And there will be another crisis, that much I can guarantee you. The next economic shoe is dropping in the US at a
time when the rest of the world is very fragile. Will Kyle Bass be right about China’s looming credit crisis? He was
spectacularly wrong on Japan but he might be right about China.
And remember a crisis in China will reinforce global deflationary headwinds, which is music to capitalists’ ears as
long as it doesn’t develop into a full-blown debt deflation crisis and Great Depression type high unemployment.
In fact, Jonathan and I discussed this doomsday scenario and he said the system cannot support high
unemployment like we had during the Great Depression. “This would threaten capitalists’ hold on power and we
would have a major crisis before reaching that point.”
I told him that I see a bleak future where inequality gets much worse (due to rising unemployment and pension
poverty, technological advances, etc.), debt deflation, one crisis after another (China, Europe, etc.) and something
is going to give eventually or else the system will implode.
Then he showed me Figures 9 and 13 from his paper A CasP Model of the Stock Market (click on images)
Basically, when systemic fear is high, like now, capitalists look at current, not future profits. The first chart does
not bode well for stocks going forward and the second one doesn’t bode well for employment growth, so expect
some type of ‘strategic sabotage’ to maintain capitalists’ hold on power.
Take the time to carefully read A CasP Model of the Stock Market, it is excellent and has a lot of information for
everyone, including institutional investors.
Finally, Jonathan and I discussed the pension crisis and he thinks pensions can be part of the solution to limit
inequality, democratize housing and curtail the disastrous effects of stock market crises. You can read his and
Shimshon’s thoughts here.
I hope you enjoyed reading this weekend comment. Please remember to kindly donate or subscribe to this blog on
the top right-hand side under my picture. All donations, big or small, are welcomed and I thank all of you who
contribute to this blog.
Below, Jonathan Nitzan’s presentation on A CasP Model of the Stock Market. Take the time to listen to this
presentation, it’s not straightforward but I think Jonathan does a great job explaining his and Shimshon’s theory
on capitalized power, how it’s intertwined with systemic fear and strategic sabotage. You can track Jonathan and
Shimshon’s latest work here.
Also, Kyle Bass, Hayman Capital Management’s chief investment officer and managing partner, discusses China’s
economy and the global risks to financial markets with Bloomberg’s Erik Schatzker at the Milken Institute Global
Conference.
Leo Kolivakis is an independent senior analyst with years of experience working on the buy and sell-side. He
has researched and invested in traditional and alternative asset classes at two of the largest public pension
funds in Canada, the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (Caisse) and the Public Sector Pension
Investment Board (PSP Investments). You can track him on Twitter (@PensionPulse). Email at
LKolivakis@gmail.com. Read other articles by Leo, or visit Leo's website.
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